

Message Text

PAGE 01 RABAT 04809 021641Z

43 S
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 ISO-00 /031 W
----- 016145
O 021604Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 447

S E C R E T RABAT 4809

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. GDS
TAGS: PFOR MO
SUBJ: BACKGROUND FOR YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HASSAN:
SECRETARY'S VISIT

1. MIDDLE EAST

A. KING HASSAN WILL BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN HEARING AND SHARING INFORMATION AND VIEWS CONCERNING EFFORTS TO REACH A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. FOR REASONS BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, HE IS DESIROUS HAVING HIS OWN ROLE DISPLAYED AS PROMINENTLY AS POSSIBLE. AS REPORTED SEPARATELY (RABAT 4764), HE FEELS HE IN TOUCH WITH MAIN CURRENTS ARAB THOUGHT ON ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM AND THAT HE HAS PARTICULARLY GOOD CONTACTS WITH PALESTINIANS. YOU MAY NEVERTHELESS FIND THAT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF SOME DETAILS OF PROBLEM IS NOT AS STRONG AS HE THINKS. HE HAS HIS OWN PEACE PLAN WHICH HE HAS NOT PUBLICIZED BUT WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WOULD PROVIDE FOR ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL TO OLD ARMISTICE LINES AS FIRST STEP, FOLLOWED BY CREATION OF PALESTINIAN BUFFER STATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION AND ENCOMPASSING GAZA AND WEST BANK PLUS UNSPECIFIED ADDITIONAL TERRITORY TAKEN FROM PRE-1967 ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS. WE WOULD EXPECT HIM TO RAISE IT WITH YOU.

B. KING'S LATEST PUBLIC MOVE WAS OCTOBER 24 PROPOSAL FOR URGENT MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS, WITH
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RABAT AS POSSIBLE SITE; AT THIS POINT SUCH A MEETING SEEMS UNLIKELY.

C. IN PAST MOROCCO HAS BEEN RELATIVELY REMOTE FROM CONFLICT. KING HAS PLAYED MODERATING ROLE, AS IN 1969 ARAB SUMMIT HELD IN RABAT, BUT HAS NOT BEEN IN FOREFRONT OF THOSE AGITATING PALESTINE ISSUE. NOW, HOWEVER, MOROCCO HAS HAD RESPECTABLE NUMBER OF TROOPS (OVER 5,000) INVOLVED IN FIGHTING; THEY HAVE ACQUITTED THEMSELVES WELL AND KING'S AUTHORITY AS SPOKESMAN FOR ARABS HAS BEEN GIVEN SUBSTANTIAL BOOST. HE IS POTENTIALLY USEFUL ALLY IN BATTLE FOR ARAB OPINION.

D. DURING RECENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS KING REPORTEDLY WAS UNDER PRESSURE TO CRITICIZE US OR TAKE ACTION, SUCH AS ASKING US TO LEAVE KENITRA COMPLEX, AND COULD HAVE GAINED CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CREDIT BY DOING SO. HE DECIDED NOT TO AGITATE KENITRA ISSUE, HOWEVER, AND WAS UNDOUBTEDLY RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIVE RESTRAINT OF LOCAL MEDIA TOWARDS US. WE BELIEVE HE SHOULD GET CREDIT FOR HIS MODERATION AND COURAGE IN THIS REGARD.

2. KENTIRA COMPLEX.

ALTHOUGH HIS MAIN INTEREST WILL BE NEAR EAST, IT IS POSSIBLE KING WILL RAISE SUBJECT US MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN MOROCCO AND REPEAT LONG-STANDING DESIRE FOR SOME QUID PRO QUO THAT WOULD MAKE THEM MORE ACCEPTABLE POLITICALLY. IT WOULD OF COURSE BE USEFUL HAVE SOMETHING TO GIVE HIM AS A QUID. IN ABSENCE OF THAT, I RECOMMEND WE EMPHASIZE OUR GRATITUDE TO KING FOR HIS COOPERATION TO DATE AND SAY WE HOPE SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS FOR OUR CONTINUED TENURE CAN BE WORKED OUT. I DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD MENTION POSSIBILITY THAT WE MAY DECIDE PHASE DOWN OR CLOSE OUT FACILITIES.

3. US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

KING MAY ALSO EXPRESS CONCERN RE DECLINE IN TOTAL US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO MOROCCO, INCLUDING PL 480, AT TIME WHEN GOM EMBARKING ON AMBITIOUS NEW FIVE YEAR PLAN. IN RESPONSE, IT WOULD BE USEFUL STRESS FOLLOWING POINTS.

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A. REDUCED LEVEL US ASSISTANCE REFLECTS DECLINING AID AVAILABILITIES WORLDWIDE AS RESULT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AND CURRENT TIGHT SUPPLY SITUATION FOR BASIC COMMODITIES, PARTICULARLY WHEAT. IT DOES NOT STEM FROM ANY ADMINISTRATION DECISION DOWNGRADE IMPORTANCE RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO.

B. USG AND GOM MUST WORK TOGETHER TO MAKE BEST POSSIBLE USE OF AVAILABLE AMERICAN AID. OUR ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED IN SECTORS WHERE IT CAN DO MOST GOOD. PARTICULARLY AGRICULTURE.

C. NEW PLAN SHOULD PROVIDE FRAMEWORK FOR DECIDING
WHERE HUMAN AND CAPITAL RESOURCES US CAN MOBILIZE WILL BE OF
GREATEST ASSISTANCE.
NEUMANN

NOTE BY OC/T: LIMDIS DELETED AND EXDIS ADDED PER S/S-O, MR. KURZE.

SECRET

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 11 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, POLICIES, NEGOTIATIONS, VISITS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973RABAT04809
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P750020-1955
From: RABAT
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731166/abqcegsq.tel
Line Count: 117
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 JAN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <04-Jan-2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <17-Jan-2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BACKGROUND FOR YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HASSAN:
TAGS: PFOR, MO, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005